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This paper discusses the limitations, omissions and value judgments of the application of 
conventional economic analysis in the evaluation of climate change mitigation policies. It is argued 
that these have biased the result of the assessment models towards the recommendation of less 
aggressive mitigation strategies. Consequently, this paper questions whether they provide appropriate 
policy recommendations. The unequal distribution of rights implicitly assumed in conventional 
economic analyses applied to climate change is questioned and an alternative approach considering a 
distribution of rights consistent with sustainable development is put forward. Finally, the points that an 
analysis consistent with sustainable development should take into account are presented. 
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The warming of the Earth has generated an environmental concern without precedent, which is 
reflected in the number of international conferences organized to discuss it. The most visible result has 
been the commitment to reduce emissions set down by the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and the agreement 
to make it operative in Bonn 2001. However, in spite of the notable softening of the terms agreed to in 
Kyoto, the final agreement was not ratified by the main country responsible for the problem. The 
greater instability in climatic events and the natural disasters experienced in the last decade, such as 
hurricane Mitch in 1998 and the floods of Venezuela in 1999 and of Germany in 2002, together with 
the increasing scientific knowledge about the phenomenon, have increased this concern. However, the 
results of conventional economic analyses applied to climate change do not seem to justify this 
concern and have been used rather to legitimatise and give a “scientific” justification to the no-
regulation policy and the free performance of the energy sector. This paper discusses the limitations, 
omissions and value judgments of the analyses that have led to this result and examines the points that 
should be considered in the analysis of climate change policies in order to be consistent with a 
sustainable development requirement. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly explains the uncertainties of the 
greenhouse effect, its consequences for climate, and the potential impacts of climate change. Section 3 
studies the problems of the application of conventional economic analysis to climate change and 
Section 4 studies some other biases that have been introduced in the study of climate change 
mitigation policies. Section 5 highlights the points to be considered for an analysis consistent with 
sustainable development. Section 6 presents the conclusions. 
 
2. Greenhouse effect and climate change 
 
Global warming and the resulting climate change are due to the intensification of what has 
been termed “the greenhouse effect”, which is a natural phenomenon, caused by various gases present 




problem arises because human activity has accelerated the accumulation of these gases, mainly 
through the combustion of fossil fuels, which has originated the warming process. According to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2001a) between 1750 and 2000 CO2 emissions 
have contributed 60%, CH4 19.8%, CFCs 14%, and N2O 6.2%, measured in terms of radiative forcing. 
CO2 concentrations have increased 31% between 1750 and 2000, from 280 to 366.8 ppm, and IPCC 
(2000) emission scenarios foresee a concentration between 490 and 1200 ppm by the end of this 
century, which would severely alter global climate.  
One particularity of climate change is that the consequences for each country do not depend 
on its individual contribution, but rather on the global deterioration. Another characteristic is that its 
effects are long lasting, if not irreversible. Lastly, the impacts of the alterations are hard to determine 
since the processes are so complex. Because of these characteristics, together with the free access to an 
environment shared by all present and future individuals, the necessary incentives for a sustainable 
administration are not given. Usually this problem is identified with “the tragedy of the commons”, 
explicitly stated by Hardin (1968). However, common management of public goods works 
appropriately in many cases, therefore, the problem is rather one of “free access”, where there is no 
management limiting the use of the resource (Aguilera-Klink 1994; Pearce 1999). In short, we are 
dealing with an externality problem of uncertain magnitude, which affects a public good at global 
scale and at both at intra- and intergenerational levels.  
 
2.1. Uncertainties associated with climate change  
There is uncertainty and ignorance about basic questions of climate change. First, there is the 
difficulty of measuring emissions, and of making predictions about future concentrations. Second, 
there are many interactions that complicate the study of the relation between emissions concentration 
and warming ―some greenhouse gases produce chemical interactions (causing problems such as the 
ozone layer depletion or acid rain) and their final effect on global warming is more difficult to 
determine than in the case of CO2. Third, even assuming a certain mean level of warming, there is 
uncertainty about the climatic impact on the different regions of the world. Fourth, there is the 




on the environment and on human well-being. Lastly, uncertainty persists when considering what 
sacrifice (in monetary terms) a stricter control of emissions would imply. In each one of these stages 
the collaboration of specialists of different fields becomes necessary.  
 
2.2. Global warming and climate change 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change last full report (Third 
Assessment Report, IPCC 2001a), the average temperature of the earth’s surface has increased around 
0.6ºC since 1861. It is estimated that the increase in the last 10000 years has been 1ºC, the rate of 
warming being constant until the last decades of the XX century, in which it increased to 0.15ºC per 
decade. The IPCC estimates that the average temperature could increase between 1.4 and 5.8ºC 
between 1990 and the end of XXI century, which is expected to cause a rise in sea level by 0.09 to 
0.88 metres during the same period. This is a rate of warming without precedent in human history. 
However, the greatest problem of global warming is not the average increase in temperature, 
but the associated climatic anomalies and changes that might occur. The result of global warming can 
be more heat or more cold, more rains or more droughts, depending on the region and, in general, 
more climatic instability with an increase in the frequency of natural disasters such as cyclones, 
droughts or floods. Furthermore, the relationship between average warming and climate change is 
complex. The increase in average Earth surface temperature might be a useful indicator of the severity 
of the problem, since the greater the warming the more the climate alterations. Nevertheless, the global 
damage is not a simple linear function of the temperature increase. 
  
2.3. Climate change impacts 
Some of the foreseeable impacts of the aforementioned climatic changes are agriculture losses, 
losses in biodiversity and forests, sea level rise, disease, energy costs, migration costs, natural 
disasters, losses in recreational activities, and water supply problems. However, if warming is mild the 
impacts might be positive for some regions: e.g. increase in water availability, better crops and warmer 
winters. Several models of integrated assessment have been made in order to incorporate the 




models present estimations, in monetary terms, of the effects caused by global climate change and 
emission reduction policies. On the whole, it is calculated that global GDP would change little with 
small temperature increases while greater temperature increases would boost the net losses (IPCC 
2001b). The impacts would be much greater in poor countries, due partly to their lower capacity to 
adapt and their greater vulnerability; in some cases, the local impact could be catastrophic. However, 
the impact difference in different areas brings about serious problems in the search for solutions as 
those countries which are less affected have few incentives to participate in an agreement implying 
costs. 
According to the IPCC there is the possibility of extreme impacts, like changes in ocean 
currents, a considerable melting of polar ice-caps, and an accelerated warming due to the release of 
carbon and methane pockets or to carbon cycle feedbacks in the terrestrial biosphere, among others. 
Should they occur, their effects would be catastrophic, and possibly irreversible in the long term. 
Although it is unknown, we can speculate that the probability of these phenomena depends on the rate, 
magnitude, and duration of climate change (IPCC 2001b). However, this possibility is simply ignored 
or assigned an arbitrarily low probability in most models’ calculations. What is certain is that, the 
more extreme the events, the more difficult humans will find it to adapt. 
According to most conventional calculations, one would need to sacrifice around 2% of the 
global annual GDP to make a significant difference in the control of emissions. As Schelling (1992: 8) 
affirms, it only “postpones the GDP of 2050 to 2051”, which might be considered a trivial impact on 
GDP. The IPCC (2001c) estimates the total cost of stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concentrations at 450, 
550 and 650 ppm to lie in the range 2.5-18, 1-8 and 0.5-2 trillions of 1990 US$, respectively 
(discounted to 1990 at 5%). Many economists have used these numbers to argue that emissions control 
can threaten economic development. However, given that most models assume a global absolute 
income increase by 2-3% per year (with greater growth in poorer countries), this means that “the cost 
of ‘climate insurance’ amounts to ‘only’ a couple of years delay in achieving very impressive growth 
in per capita income levels” (Azar and Schneider 2002: 77), even when this cost is as high as 5% of 
global income per year. Thus, even for the most pessimistic models, concentration stabilization and a 




rates between a case with an unconstrained use of fossil fuels and a case with strong restrictions on the 
use of fossil fuels would likely be less than a tenth of a percent per year over this century” (Azar and 
Schneider 2002: 78). Nevertheless, in general, current conventional models suggest that it is not 
profitable to take action for mitigating climate change, or that the action should be very limited (e.g. 
Manne and Richels 1992, 1999; Peck and Teisberg 1992, 1994, 1999; Nordhaus 1993, 1994; Manne, 
et al. 1995; Nordhaus and Yang 1996; Chakravorty et al. 1997; Nordhaus and Boyer 1999; Hamaide 
and Boland 2000), a result that has strongly influenced the energy policy of some industrialized 
countries. However, the validity of this policy recommendation is challenged by the limitations, value 
judgments and biases in critical assumptions that many of these models incorporate.  
 
3.  Problems of conventional economic analysis applied to climate change 
 
Many of the models that have been used are based on conventional economic cost–benefit 
analysis (e.g. Nordhaus et al. various years; Peck and Teisberg 1992; Manne et al. 1995). On the other 
hand, various models have also been created to search for cost-effective paths to reduce emissions and 
achieve specific emissions or atmospheric concentrations goals. These models, in spite of not being as 
pretentious, maintain a good part of the limitations of the conventional economic cost–benefit analyses 
applied to climate change and most of them also incorporate some biases in assumptions that are 
critical for their results, which limits their capacity to give appropriate policy recommendations.  
 
3.1. The discounting of climate change impacts 
Conventional economic analysis gives less importance to flows that take place in the future (a 
thorough review of the problems of conventional discounting can be found in Broome (1992) and 
Price (1993, 1996)). The application of conventional discounting devalues and practically removes 
from the analysis the impacts that occur in the distant future in such a way that for these models the 
maintenance of the necessary conditions for life far in the future is of negligible present value 
(although this would not be the case if these conditions were given an indefinite value). Part of the 




Broome (1992), Cline (1992), Nordhaus (1994), and Fankhauser (1994) agree about the importance of 
this choice for the prescribed mitigation level of greenhouse gases. Usually, the social discount rate (s) 
in these models is expressed with the Ramsey formula: 
s =  + g 
where  is the pure time preference rate,  is the elasticity of marginal utility (absolute value) of 
consumption and g is the growth rate of per capita consumption. That is to say, discounting is applied 
because of impatience and the belief that in the future there would be more wealth per head. 
Conventional economic analysis applies the time discount of present society to discount all 
costs and benefits that will occur in the future, as if all future impacts occurred to present individuals. 
The consumption of future individuals is discounted with a rate that shows the impatience of present 
society, while the logical procedure would be to consider the preferences of present society regarding 
the well-being of the future generations suffering climate change impacts. An intergenerational 
weighting appropriately showing these preferences should be applied. However, considering these 
altruistic preferences does not guarantee that the interests of future generations are appropriately taken 
into account. If future generations have certain rights that should be respected, these rights should be 
included in the analysis (Padilla 2002), a point developed in section 5.  
The practical application of the argument of the decreasing marginal utility of consumption is 
also controversial. To apply a high discount rate because of an assumed future prosperity could lead to 
compromising this very prosperity because of undervaluing the impacts of future climate change. 
Moreover, many of the models applied to climate change extrapolate future rates of economic growth 
from past behaviour, without considering the negative impacts that this growth has caused on the 
environment.  
Furthermore, if discounting is applied to future individuals because of the belief they will be 
richer, this same reasoning would justify weighting the impacts of present individuals according to 
their wealth, which is rarely done (Azar and Sterner 1996). Conventional models assume that future 
individuals will be richer. This induces the idea that it is not profitable to make efforts in the present to 
reduce emissions that will affect future people (with a much smaller marginal utility). According to 




of present poor people and it would be more efficient to increase their standard of life. Neumayer 
(1999) argues that a lower time discounting would be inconsistent with intergenerational equity, since 
he believes that the future will always be richer. However, it should be taken into account that the 
countries that are creating most of the problem are rich countries, while the ones that will suffer most 
severely are poor countries. Actually, climate change is already affecting poor countries with an 
increasing frequency of anomalies and climatic disasters. It is, at least, doubtful that the poor of the 
future will be in much better condition than the rich of the present; even more so if devastating effects 
of climate change on their ecological and socio-economic systems are allowed. If the argument of 
marginal utility is used coherently, then when comparing costs and benefits, it should be taken into 
account that the hypothetical renouncement of greater growth that might be involved in a stricter 
emissions control would be at the expense of the richest countries (main emitters), while climate 
change mitigation would entail that the standards of life in the poor countries (with a much higher 
marginal utility) do not deteriorate. According to their higher marginal utility, the poor should be 
given greater weight than they are given in conventional economic cost–benefit analyses. Social cost–
benefit analysis is based on a weighting according to individual’s wealth (see Squire and van der Tak, 
1975), however, it is little advocated by mainstreamers. 
Many economists still use a much cruder basis for discounting, that is, the opportunity cost of 
investment funds. In this way the resources would be placed in the highest yielding projects, so 
obtaining a greater future well-being. This argument is hardly justifiable in the intergenerational 
context as it is based on the full reinvestment of the revenues obtained with the exploitation of the 
resources, which has not occurred in the past and is unlikely to occur in the future (Price, 1996).  
 
3.2. The Hicks–Kaldor compensation criterion and valuation problems 
Conventional economic cost–benefit analysis is based on the Hicks-Kaldor compensation 
criterion. According to this, a project is socially profitable if those that gain could compensate those 
that lose (Kaldor criterion), or if the losers cannot pay the winners not to undertake the project (Hicks 
criterion). If the present value of the benefits is greater than the present value of the costs, then it is 




improving their initial situation (potential Pareto-improvement). If compensation was paid, everybody 
would gain and a net gain for society would occur (actual Pareto-improvement). However, whether 
this compensation occurs is considered irrelevant for the result of economic cost–benefit analysis.  
In ordinary evaluations, economic cost–benefit analysis without compensation can be justified 
if it is assumed that the marginal utility of a monetary unit of costs has the same social value as a 
monetary unit of benefits (Lind, 1997). Another justification is that, if there are many small projects 
everybody gains on the average (thus, compensation would not be in the scope of the project, but in 
the political sphere). As Lind states, the ethical validity of the first argument depends on the initial 
distribution being judged as correct. In climate change, the very unequal distribution (both of impacts 
and incomes) between those that gain and those that lose would invalidate this justification, while the 
magnitude of the impacts we are considering would invalidate the second one. Therefore, cost–benefit 
analysis of projects without compensation would not be appropriate in the context of climate change. 
Furthermore, currently, there are no institutions in place to make sure that a monetary compensation 
between present and future generations will find its way into the hands of people meriting 
compensation, so nothing indicates that the compensation from those that “win” to those that “lose” 
needed for a Pareto-improvement would be implemented.  
Another issue is whether monetary compensation is appropriate. Accepting that a monetary 
compensation is valid requires making very strong assumptions, such as substitutability between any 
types of goods, which is not scientifically based, but rather based in faith or in the interest of having 
easily tractable models. Climate change might cause irreversibilities and catastrophes, and some goods 
and processes that cannot be replaced can be destroyed. There are also many relevant factors that are 
at least questionable that could be translated into the monetary valuations of real or hypothetical 
markets. Furthermore, it implies a strong value-laden premise to assume that doing harm can be 
compensated by doing some other good, or that doing some good entitles us to deliberately do harm to 
other people (without their consent). Many authors argue that ecological damage to future generations 
cannot be compensated by doing them some other good (Sen 1982; Spash 1994; Azar 2000). In 
decisions affecting elemental rights, such as the basic conditions of life of future generations, the 




Conventional cost–benefit analyses applied to climate change assume that values are known, 
exogenously determined and translatable into money terms. Although people do not have well 
articulated values about ecosystems, analysts assume that they do (and that they can be applied in 
other places and periods), and that the monetary values assumed in the studies determine the preferred 
policies (Lave and Dowlatabadi 1993). The values of ecosystems have more dimensions than those 
translatable into monetary terms, and these different dimensions should be taken into account and not 
just ignored, imposing the particular view of those that consider that everything should be reduced to 
money terms (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994). Different regions, populations, and cultures, as well as 
different generations, are affected in different ways by climate change, and in some cases they value 
the same goods in a different way (Lave and Dowlatabadi 1993). The compensation criterion also 
implies pricing  human lives, which, in itself, requires the assumption that the method for determining 
its value is correct and that money in rich countries can be compared with lives in poor countries (Azar 
2000), which again implies a determinant value judgement —one of the issues that generated more 
controversy in climate change debate was the use by the IPCC (Pearce et al. 1996) of a monetary value 
assigned for a death in a rich country 15 times higher than for a death in a poor country, values based 
on the estimates by Fankhauser (1995) and Tol (1995) derived from willingness-to-pay measures. 
Another problem of the valuations included in economic cost–benefit analyses is that the 
willingness-to-pay measure is often used instead of the willingness-to-accept measure (e.g. 
Fankhauser 1994, 1995; Tol 1995; Pearce et al. 1996). There is important empirical evidence that 
counters neoclassical theory, showing these valuations to be very different, even in the case of small 
income effects (where the impact is small in relation to the total income of the individual). In 
contingent valuation studies, the ratio between willingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay ranges 
from 2 to more than 10. In the case of climate change, the income effect is significant, which causes 
the willingness-to-pay to be much smaller than the value of the compensation people would accept. In 
addition to the income effect, there is the endowment effect (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), which 
implies than losses are more weighted than gains. The difference between willingness-to-pay and 
willingness-to-accept can also be due to the consideration of some goods as inalienable. These 




measure when it is not the one stated by the problem, and even less so in a problem with the great 
magnitudes of climate change.  
 
3.3. The distribution of rights in conventional economic analysis 
 Conventional economic cost–benefit analyses applied to climate change implicitly assume that 
the Earth and all its resources, including the climatic system, belong to the present, and that it has the 
right to do with them whatever cost–benefit analysis’s criterion shows as acceptableincluding the 
right to destroy them. Then, for these models there is a natural right to pollute, without obligation to 
compensate those that suffer the consequences of this pollution. The only valid valuations for 
economic cost–benefit analyses are those of markets, where future generations cannot bid and present-
day poor people have very limited means of doing so.  However, considering that the same existence 
of future generations should depend only on the present preferences that can be expressed in real or 
hypothetical markets seems, at least, ethically questionable. 
Starting from the conventional perspective, Hamaide and Boland (2000) try to “overcome” the 
limitation of Hicks-Kaldor potential compensation criterion by studying “Pareto-optimal” solutions 
where “everybody wins” thanks to effective compensation, which they call the “cooperative solution”. 
Their solution suggests that poor countries, the most benefited by mitigation policies, pay an economic 
compensation to China and the United States so that they control their emissions. In spite of the 
neutrality that conventional analysis tries to convey, it is undeniable that it is laden with strong value 
judgements that are ethically questionable and politically unacceptable  it is hardly justifiable on 
ethical grounds that poor countries should subsidize the United States’s emissions control.  
The potential compensation implicit in optimisation analyses consists of the hypothetical 
payment by those that will be affected in the future in order that the present incurs the “costs” of 
controlling its emissions. The optimal level of mitigation is achieved when the so-called “marginal 
cost” of reducing emissions equals the present discounted value of the “marginal benefit” experienced 
by future generations. If effective compensation was required it would involve the payment of a 
compensation by future generations in order to avoid the present destroying the necessary conditions 




intergenerational compensation like this would be very difficult to establish, but the main point is that 
it results from the assumption of a very unfair distribution of rights. 
The countries that are most affected by climate change are, with all probability, the poor ones, 
while the main responsible for the problem and the only ones that have resources to act fall to the rich 
countries (see Tóth (1999) for a review on the issues of equity in climate change). These countries 
have an ecological debt to the rest of the world and to future generations, since they have appropriated 
and made an unsustainable use of an environment that belongs to all present and future individuals (for 
an analysis on the “ecological debt” see Martínez Alier (1998)). It is not justifiable, under any 
acceptable concept of equity or justice, that the poor have to suffer the ecological burden that involves 
the greater development of rich countries. 
Moreover, stating the problem as costs for the present and benefits for the future tends to 
facilitate the approval of policies unfavourable to the future, since usually, a phenomenon is more 
weighed when it is considered as a loss than when it is considered as a gain (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979). This can also affect the chosen discount rate. As Mohr (1995) states, the ambiguity of the time 
preference depending on whether it refers to costs or benefits, implies that according to how the 
problem is presented, the citizens can be persuaded to agree with a particular opinion. Unfortunately, 
the result of this persuasion is often presented as the only “scientific” result.  
There are strong arguments for questioning the ethical validity of the distribution of rights of 
conventional analysis and the application of the (hypothetical) compensation criterion to climate 
change. It also seems clear that in order to achieve a more transparent analysis the more than 
questionable value judgements that are hidden behind the analyses should be made explicit. 
 
 
4. Some additional limitations, omissions and value judgments   
 
The problems of the models used for determining the appropriate mitigation policies go 
beyond the limitations of conventional economic cost–benefit analysis. In general, both cost–benefit 




omissions, and assumptions about factors that critically affect their results. The problem is that the 
biases they introduce always lean in the same direction: they tend to undervalue the losses and 
overvalue the economic gains of climate change, and hence lead to the recommendation that either 
emission control should be mild, or that there should be no control, at least in the short term.  
First, they tend to make quite optimistic assumptions about the virtues of economic growth. 
Current models usually assume high rates of future economic growth justifying it by past growth, 
without taking into account the negative environmental effect of this growth. This leads to the 
application of a high discount rate (because of decreasing marginal utility of consumption) and to 
assuming a great capacity of adaptation, thus considering less serious the impacts caused by climate 
change.  
 Another bias of some of the most influential models is highlighted by Price (1995) who states 
that Nordhaus (1993) may seriously underestimate the residence time and costs of atmospheric CO2. 
Price argues that the parameters estimated in Nordhaus’s model of CO2 uptake are wrong as land use 
sources and “missing sinks” are not adequately considered, and oceanic uptake is modelled as a simple 
exponential. Schultz and Kasting (1997) argue that many of the integrated assessment climate–
economy models are based on pre-industrial CO2 uptake rates. These undervalue the life of CO2 in the 
atmosphere as they do not appropriately consider the reduced rate of uptake as atmospheric and 
oceanic partial pressures converge.
 
Consequently, the future concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere 
and the persistence of global warming are underestimated by Nordhaus (1993, 1994), which biases the 
result towards lesser “optimal” reduction. 
 The climatic models employed in the studies are continuous and do not reflect the 
discontinuities that might occur. They assume that the change in CO2 atmospheric concentrations is 
smooth and marginal (which could be reasonable) and then “deduce” that climate change and their 
impacts will be smooth and marginal (Pizer 1996). This involves ignoring issues such as that oceanic 
currents and the atmospheric system could change to an alternative equilibrium causing rapid and 
extreme changes, with catastrophic impacts in some cases. Moreover, estimates generally do not take 
into account the effects of changes in the variability of climate (IPCC 2001b). Conventional 




warming on ecosystems (Howarth 1996). 
Under certain conditions (risks exogenously determined, and certainty about the different 
possible results and their respective probabilities) conventional methods can lead to an efficient 
allocation of resources in the presence of risk. These conditions are not met in the case of climate 
change, where the risks are poorly understood and depend on human performance. The models have 
tended to assume that uncertainty is small and manageable (Weyant et al. 1995). However, in climate 
change many interactions occur between complex natural and social systems in which little is known. 
Not recognizing the levels of uncertainty and ignorance in the models leads to erroneous results that 
should not be qualified as “optimal”. Moreover, these models ignore the possibility of extreme 
phenomena and catastrophic events, or simply assign them a negligible probability, when in fact both 
the possible results and their corresponding probabilities are unknown. A factor that should be 
important in decision-making is not taken into account, which biases the result towards a lower 
emissions control. As Azar (1998) argues, almost any level of mitigation can be justified just by 
changing the probability assigned to these catastrophic events, and there is strong uncertainty about 
the true probability. While the information and models on which the assessments base their results are 
very uncertain and sensitive to value judgments, the authors tend to present too precise “scientific” 
estimations and are too self-confident in their policy recommendations in an unjustified way or at 
least not justified on a scientific basis a point already highlighted by Funtowicz and Ravetz (1994).  
Most analyses (including the ones by Nordhaus) overlook the fact that, besides its impact in 
greenhouse effect, emissions control has other significant associated positive effects (secondary 
benefits). The reduction in the particles that result from the combustion of fossil fuels (such as SOx, 
NOx and volatile organic compounds) would lead to a reduction in pollution and the resulting 
enhancement of health and well-being. If this were taken into account, the control of emissions as well 
as the rate of reduction would be greater than those indicated by most analyses (Ekins, 1996). 
Furthermore, the models rarely consider the possible positive economic effects associated with the 
control of emissions, such as the “double dividend” (environmental benefits and economic gains of 
reducing externalities with taxation, especially if distortionary taxes are reduced simultaneously) or 




 Several studies (e.g. Nordhaus and Yang 1996; McKibbin et al. 1999; Nordhaus and Boyer 
1999; Hamaide and Boland 2000) assume a negative or very low cost of reduction in poor countries 
and greater marginal costs of reduction in richer countries. The result is that, in order to achieve 
“global efficiency”, the greater reduction should be made in poor countries. Chapman and Khanna 
(2000) argue that there is no clear theoretical or empirical basis for these assumptions. But, even if this 
was the case, focusing control efforts in the third world would not lead to a very ambitious 
environmental policy. 
 It is usually assumed that even if there were no controls, a peak in greenhouse gas emissions 
would occur, after which these emissions would diminish. This is known as the environmental 
Kuznets curve hypothesis, according to which the environmental problem would disappear in the long 
term thanks to economic growth. Empirical evidence for this hypothesis concerning greenhouse gases 
tends to refute it, especially in the case of CO2 (see e.g. Roca et al. 2001). Even if the hypothesis was 
true, the delinking between environmental pressure and economic growth would occur at very high 
levels of income and emissions, which are a very long way from current levels in the developing 
countries (Selden and Song 1994; Stern et al. 1996). Therefore, ambitious environmental policies 
should be applied if much higher levels of environmental degradation are to be avoided. Moreover, 
present forecasts of future emissions (IPCC 2000) are less optimistic than the ones used in these 
models. 
 Another point is that most models assume that technical change is exogenous. Important 
annual improvements in energy efficiency are assumed (reductions in the energy demand per unit of 
product) independent of the impact of energy prices, which translates into a continuous decline in 
energy intensity (the energy to real GDP ratio) over time. Chapman and Khanna (2000) argue that 
between 1980 and 1996 energy intensity has been constant at a global level, with a reduction in rich 
countries and an increase in poor countries. Therefore, past experience would not necessarily justify 
the application of such assumptions. On the other hand, the possibility of technical change induced by 
the response of firms to market conditions is, in general, not considered. There is evidence that an 
important part of technical change in the energy sector is endogenous (Grubb and Walker 1992). 




change and they conclude that it would involve the recommendation of accelerating emissions control 
because the same mitigation develops the knowledge that allows emissions control at lower cost and 
causes it to be very cheap in the long term. 
Lastly, it should be pointed out that, for the moment, the impacts associated with the upper 
margin of warming estimated by the last report of the IPCC (2001b) have not yet been investigated. 
Consequently, the impacts of climate change and so the adequate reduction in emissions might have 
been underestimated. 
  
5. Towards an analysis consistent with sustainable development 
The most popular definition of sustainable development states that it is “…development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs.” (WCED 1987: 43). A development complying with this definition would not allow the 
present to use resources in a way that jeopardizes the opportunities of the future, so it implies an 
equity commitment with the future.  
This equity commitment and a fair treatment to future generations would be guaranteed if the 
analysis recognized the rights of future generations to enjoy a global ecological and economic capacity 
non-diminished in relation to the one we presently enjoy and thus recognised the corresponding 
obligations of present generations (Padilla, 2002). In other words, recognizing that the Earth and its 
resources, including the climatic system, belong not only to the present rich people, but also to all 
(present and future) individuals. As Page (1983) states, life opportunities of future generations will be 
undiminished if they inherit the same resource base as present generations inherited. This view does 
not imply that present generations cannot take profit of natural resources, but that the global resource 
base should be maintained. There might be some goods susceptible of being compensated and others 
which cannot be substituted, such as basic processes and some critical levels of certain environmental 
goods, which should be protected.  
Using this view, the biased position of conventional economic analyses of climate change 
would not be correct when they state the issue as the present incurring in some “costs” for reducing (or 




issue is to deal with the limitation of uncontrolled emissions growth, recognizing the rights of future 
generations so that their ecological and socio-economic system does not deteriorate further in relation 
to the one we enjoy. This is not to “give” anything to future generations, but rather to stop taking away 
something to which, from the sustainable development perspective, they are entitled to.  
Present generations have the responsibility to study how their performance will affect the 
climate and environment of future generations, and which is the least costly way of respecting their 
rights. From an ethical point of view this alternative distribution of rights would be a more legitimate 
starting point for the analysis of climate change policies.  
The obligation to respect the rights of future generations that entails sustainable development, 
jointly with the limitations of conventional models, imposes an analysis of mitigation policies 
incorporating constraints in terms of climate change impacts. Given the impossibility of establishing 
an adequate compensation because of the uncertainties, ignorance, substitution problems, non-
marginal changes and the problems involved in the application of conventional discounting to climate 
change, the obligations of the present should lead to the “stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system”, the ultimate objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. In 
this way, guaranteeing their ecological opportunities, a fair treatment to the future would be ensured. 
Moreover, the rights of the future should be respected in a way that involves the least sacrifice to the 
present.  
Various papers have investigated cost-effective paths of reduction of emissions in order to 
achieve different concentration targets. Unfortunately, most of them have not been overly concerned 
with identifying what level of concentration is appropriate or consistent with sustainable development, 
neither have they worried about incorporating all the information that is relevant for decision-making, 
but have been undertaken as simple technical cost-minimization exercises. Some of the problems that 
these models embody have been shown above and many of them suggest an even smaller reduction of 
emissions in the short term than economic cost–benefit analyses (e.g. Richels and Edmonds 1995). 
Hammitt (1999) shows, for different concentration targets, a lower short-term aggressiveness in 




premature retirement of existent capital stock; existence of carbon sinks, which means that the 
proportion of CO2 remaining in the atmosphere is lower for earlier emissions; technological progress, 
which causes cheaper emission reduction in the future; and because of discounting, which makes the 
present value of costs lower if reduction is delayed (Wigley et al. 1996). Nevertheless, these 
explanations are quite questionable. It has already been shown that if technical change is induced and 
not exogenous as is usually assumed, it is better to reduce emissions earlier (Grubb and Köhler 2000), 
and short term policies would accelerate the development of the changes that would reduce mitigation 
costs. Grubb (1997) casts doubts on the appropriateness of postponing the renewal of capital and 
argues that this could involve greater total costs, since it would also postpone the innovation which 
reduces mitigation costs. These results are also influenced by the fact that, in general, the impacts of 
different warming rates as well as the discontinuities and possible changes of equilibrium are not taken 
into account. If these factors were considered, one would question the appropriateness of prematurely 
reducing the rates of carbon uptake of natural sinks. In summary, a target- or objective-based approach 
does not necessarily involve a lower reduction than conventional cost–benefit analyses, especially if 
the objective has to be consistent with sustainable development. 
One of the approaches that has gone further in the search for an integrated assessment 
coherent with sustainable development is the tolerable windows approach, a method explained and 
discussed in Petschel-Held et al. (1999), Yohe (1999) and Dowlatabadi (1999). Starting from the 
constraints on tolerable changes, it imposes limitations on the rate of warming, the level of 
concentrations, the path of emissions and finally the policy instruments. It can consider different types 
of information and does not require translating everything into monetary terms. Through this 
approach, the obligation of preserving the natural environment for future generations could become a 
quantitative constraint in policies. 
Several authors argue that the targets approach is inconsistent with determining the optimal 
allocation of all resources. However, this criticism is based on the implicit premise of conventional 
analysis, that of not recognizing any rights of future generations. Even Nordhaus (1997), author of the 
most influential neoclassical optimisation model, sees a clear opposition between economic optimality 





Nevertheless, a serious limitation of cost-effectiveness analyses is that they do not take into 
account the short and medium term impacts, focusing only in the final long-term objective. This could 
delay the reduction of emissions, since higher short term emissions could be compensated with greater 
reductions in the long term, which does not happen in the cost–benefit approach (Grubb 1997). The 
short and long term sacrifices that the reduction involves are accounted for under both analyses, but 
the short and medium term consequences of emissions are only considered under cost–benefit 
analysis. This is inconsistent with the distribution of rights implied by our view of sustainable 
development.  
An evaluation consistent with sustainable development requires, first, the introduction of 
limits to ensure that climate change impacts do not jeopardize the global ecological and economic 
capacity of future generations and, second, the consideration of all the different impacts that might 
occur. The impact of any climate change on the future implies an alteration of the endowment to be 
enjoyed by future generations and so should be considered in the determination of adequate policies. 
The structure of rights that sustainable development implies turns any impact that diminishes the 
capacity of the future into an obligation for the present. Once any intolerable (and so non-susceptible 
of being compensated for) impact is avoided, the compensation for any ecological debt acquired with 
the future for present contamination should be accounted for and made effective, and monetary 
compensation might not be the most appropriate kind. The necessary information for determining 
which impacts would be intolerable should be collected (a decision that cannot be based just on an 
economist’s judgement or assumption but on trans-disciplinary research) and the institutional 
framework should be created to be able to establish and carry out the adequate compensations in order 
that the future can receive them (Padilla 2002).  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper presented a critical review of the limitations, value judgments and omissions of the 




implicit assumptions involved in the applications of conventional economic cost–benefit analysis to 
climate change are inappropriate for a problem with such an extreme uncertainty and severity for 
future generations. Moreover, all variables relevant for society should be taken into account, not only 
those that can be valued in money. It would be more reasonable to try to obtain solutions that could be 
considered satisfactory using all the available information (including the information that social cost–
benefit analysis might provide), and taking into account the interests of all stakeholders, than to 
attempt by conventional analysis to obtain “optimal” points at the margin through models based on 
unreal and strongly value-laden assumptions and that are unable to show all the facets of the problem.  
Most studies (including cost-effectiveness ones) have also tended to incorporate value judgements and 
arbitrary assumptions and even to ignore a large part of the relevant information, which has clearly 
biased the results towards the conclusion that climate change is not a problem requiring urgent action. 
Conventional economic cost–benefit analyses applied to climate change implicitly assume that 
there is the natural right to pollute or even destroy the climatic system. The present paper rejects this 
premise and suggests an alternative approach in which future generations are entitled to a non-
deteriorated ecological and economic capacity with respect to the one we enjoy, and therefore present 
generations have an obligation to avoid or to compensate for any further deterioration of it. An 
evaluation of mitigation policies starting from a distribution of rights consistent with sustainable 
development requires ensuring a habitable climate far in the future and establishing effective 
compensations for the negative impacts caused to the future. Many economists and politicians have 
argued that this would endanger economic prosperity, an assessment without any scientific basis as, in 
fact, even the most pessimistic analyses suggest that buying this “climate insurance” might be 
compatible with an impressive increase in economic wealth (Azar and Schneider 2002). 
An appropriate assessment of the policies to apply in climate change also requires 
incorporating the growing knowledge about the phenomenon. In the evaluation of adequate policies, 
all relevant information should be taken into account without using model complexity to hide value 
judgements and arbitrary assumptions about questionable factors or hiding elements that are 
determinants for decision-making. On the contrary, the analysis should serve to clarify what are the 




knowledge of the phenomenon through the same process. The gathering of information, the study of 
alternative policies, the estimation of impacts and the knowledge of the critical parameters should lead 
to a better position for making informed decisions. 
Even if the models determining the adequate policies (consistent with sustainable 
development) are designed, it is necessary to ensure that there are institutions in place that can 
establish emissions control and can be responsible for the transfer of adequate compensations (for a 
review of the role institutions in environmental protection and of its appropriate design see Young 
(2002), Haas et al. (1993) and Esty (1994)). These institutions should be able to achieve reduction 
commitments by different countries according to their capacity and their responsibility in the problem. 
It is urgent that the adoption of international commitments should go beyond the Kyoto Protocol and 
the Bonn 2001 agreement. It is imperative that these institutions have the capacity to sanction 
atmosphere free-rider practices and so reduce the incentives to cheat on the agreements. The 
disappearance of credible sanctions (besides the wide consideration of natural carbon sinks) of the 
Bonn agreement calls its effectiveness into serious question.  
Finally, people of poorer countries are suffering and will continue to suffer the most severe 
impacts of climate change, while some countries have occupied and are occupying much more 
environmental space in terms of historic CO2 emissions than would correspond to their population 
(Alcántara and Roca 1999). Rich countries have therefore a moral obligation to pay the “ecological 
debt” acquired in having expropriated and destroyed the right of poor countries to a non-deteriorated 
climate. From an ethical point of view, in the long term, the only justifiable distribution of rights is the 
one that gives the same right to any human being — present or future. The distribution according to 
current per capita emission, as established in the Kyoto Protocol agreements, strongly favours those 




I am grateful to Federico Aguilera Klink, Vicent Alcántara, Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh, Joan 




and the editor for their useful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. The opinions expressed in 
this paper and any remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the author. Financial support from 
projects BEC2000-415 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología) and 2001SGR-160 (Direcció General de 






Aguilera-Klink, F. 1994. “Some notes on the misuse of classic writings in economics on the subject of 
common property”. Ecological Economics 9: 221-228. 
Alcántara, V. and Roca, J. 1999. “CO2 emissions and the occupation of the ‘environmental space’. An 
empirical exercise”. Energy Policy 27: 505-508. 
Azar, C. 1998. “Are optimal CO2 emissions really optimal?”. Environmental and Resource Economics 
11: 301-315. 
Azar, C. 2000. “Economics and distribution in the greenhouse”. Climatic Change 47: 233-238. 
Azar, C. and Schneider, S.H. 2002. “Are the economic costs of stabilizing the atmosphere 
prohibitive?”. Ecological Economics, 42: 73-80. 
Azar, C. and Sterner, T. 1996. “Discounting and distributional considerations in the context of global 
warming”. Ecological Economics 19: 169-184. 
Broome, J. 1992. Counting the Costs of Global Warming. Cambridge: White Horse Press. 
Chakravorty, U., Roumasset, J. and Tse, K. 1997. “Endogenous substitution among energy resources 
and global warming”. Journal of Political Economy 105: 1201-1234. 
Chapman, D. and Khanna, N. 2000. “Crying no wolf: why economists don’t worry about climate 
change, and should”. Climatic Change 47: 225-232. 
 Cline, W.R. 1992. The Economics of Global Warming. Washington DC: Institute for International 
Economics. 
Dowlatabadi, H. 1999. “Climate change thresholds and guardrails for emissions”. Climatic Change 41: 
297-301. 
Ekins, P. 1996. “The secondary benefits of CO2 abatement: how much emission reduction do they 
justify?”. Ecological Economics 16: 13-24. 
Esty, D.C. 1994. Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future. Washington D.C.: Institute 





Fankhauser, S. 1994. “The social costs of greenhouse emissions: An expected value approach”. 
Energy Journal 15: 157-184. 
Fankhauser, S. 1995. Valuing climate change: the economics of the greenhouse. London: Earthscan. 
Funtowicz, S.O. and Ravetz, J.R. 1994. “The worth of a songbird: ecological economics as a post-
normal science”. Ecological Economics 10: 197-207. 
Grubb, M. 1997. “Technologies, energy systems and the timing of CO2 emissions abatement. An 
overview of economic issues”. Energy Policy 25: 159-172. 
Grubb, M. and Köhler, J. 2000. “Induced technical change: Evidence and implications for energy-
environmental modeling and policy”. Working Paper 0031, Department of Applied Economics, 
Cambridge University. 
Grubb, M. and Walker, J. 1992. Emerging Energy Technologies: Impacts and Policy Implications. 
London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
Haas, P.M., Keohane, R.O. and Levy, M.A. 1993. Institutions for the Earth. Sourthes of Effective 
International Environmental Protection. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
Hamaide, B. and Boland, J.J. 2000. “Benefits, costs, and cooperation in greenhouse gas abatement”. 
Climatic Change 47: 239-258. 
Hammitt, J.K. 1999. “Evaluation endpoints and climate policy: atmospheric stabilization, benefit–cost 
analysis, and near-term greenhouse-gas emissions”. Climatic Change 41: 447-468.  
Hardin, G. 1968. “The tragedy of the commons”. Science 162: 1243-1248. 
Howarth, R.B. 1996. “Climate change and overlapping generations”. Contemporary Economic Policy 
14: 100-111. 
IPCC. 2000. Emissions Scenarios. Summary for Policy Makers. Special Report of IPCC Working 
Group III, in http://www.ipcc.ch 
IPCC. 2001a. Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the 
Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge: 




IPCC. 2001b. Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working 
Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
IPCC. 2001c. Climate Change 2001: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Third 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. 1979. “Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk”. 
Econometrica 47: 363-391. 
Lave, L.B. and Dowlatabadi, H. 1993. “Climate change policy: the effects of personal beliefs and 
scientific uncertainty”. Environmental Science Technology 27: 1962-1972. 
Lind, R.C. 1997. “Intertemporal equity, discounting, and economic efficiency in water policy 
evaluation”. Climatic Change 37: 41-62. 
Manne, A.S. and Richels, R.G. 1992. Buying Greenhouse Insurance: The Economic Costs of Carbon 
Dioxide Emission Limits. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Manne, A.S. and Richels, R.G. 1999. “The Kyoto protocol: A cost effective strategy for meeting 
environmental objectives?”. Energy Journal, Special Issue: The Costs of the Kyoto Protocol – A 
Multi-model Evaluation: 1-23. 
Manne, A., Mendelsohn, R. and Richels, R. 1995. “MERGE – A model for evaluating regional and 
global effects of GHG reduction policies”. Energy Policy 23: 17-34. 
Martínez-Alier, J. 1998. “Ecological debtexternal debt”, in 
http://www.cosmovisiones.com/DeudaEcologica/. 
McKibbin, W.J., Ross, M.T., Shackleton, R. and Wilcoxen, P.J. 1999. “Emissions trading, capital 
flows and the Kyoto protocol”. Energy Journal. Special Issue: The Costs of the Kyoto Protocol – A 
Multi-Model Evaluation: 287-333. 
Mohr, E. 1995. “Greenhouse policy persuasion: towards a positive theory of discounting the climate 
future”. Ecological Economics 15: 235-245. 
Neumayer, E. 1999. Weak versus Strong Sustainability. Exploring the Limits of Two Opposing 




Nordhaus, W.D. 1993. “Rolling the “DICE”: An optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse 
gases”. Resource and Energy Economics 5: 27-50. 
Nordhaus, W.D. 1994. Managing the Global Commons: The Economics of Climate Change. 
Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Nordhaus, W.D. 1997. “Discounting in economics and climate change”. Climatic Change 37: 315-
328. 
Nordhaus, W.D. and Boyer, J.G. 1999. Roll the DICE Again: Economic Models of Global Warming. 
Cambridge MA: Yale University, MIT Press. 
Nordhaus, W.D. and Yang, Z. 1996. “A regional dynamic general-equilibrium model of alternative 
climate-change strategies”. American Economic Review 86: 741-765. 
Padilla, E. 2002. “Intergenerational equity and sustainability”. Ecological Economics 41: 69-83. 
Pearce, D., 1999. “Economic analysis of global environmental issues: global warming, stratospheric 
ozone and biodiversity”, in van den Bergh, J.C.J.M. (ed.) Handbook of Environmental and 
Resource Economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Pearce, D., Cline, W.R., Achanta, A.N., Fankhauser, S., Pachauri, R.K., Tol, R.S.J. and Vellinga, P. 
1996. The Social Costs of Climate Change: Damages and Benefits of Control. Report of the IPCC 
Working Group III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Peck, S.C. and Teisberg, T.J. 1992. “CETA: a model for carbon emissions trajectory assessment”. 
Energy Journal 13: 55-77. 
Peck, S.C. and Teisberg, T.J. 1994. “Optimal carbon emissions trajectories when damages depend on 
the rate or level of global warming”. Climatic Change 28: 289-314. 
Peck, S.C. and Teisberg, T.J. 1999. “CO2 emissions control agreement: incentives for regional 
participation”. Energy Journal. Special Issue: The Costs of the Kyoto Protocol – A Multi-Model 
Evaluation: 367-390. 
Petschel-Held, G., Schellnhuber, H.-J., Bruckner, T., Tóth, F. and Hasselmann, K. 1999. “The 





Pizer, W.A. 1996. Optimal Choice of Instrument and Stringency under Uncertainty: Dynamic General 
Equilibrium Analysis of Climate Change Policy. Washington DC: Resources for the future. 
Price, C. 1993. Time, Discounting and Value. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Price, C. 1995. “Emissions, concentrations and disappearing CO2”. Resource and Energy Economics 
17: 87-97. 
Price, C. 1996. “Discounting and project appraisal: from the bizarre to the ridiculous”, in Kirkpatrick, 
C. and  Weiss, J. Cost–Benefit Analysis and Project Appraisal in Developing Countries. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.                                                                                                     
Richels, R. and Edmonds, J. 1995. “The economics of stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concentrations”. 
Energy Policy 23: 373-378. 
Roca, J., Padilla, E, Farré, M. and Galletto, V. 2001. “Economic growth and atmospheric pollution in 
Spain: discussing the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis”. Ecological Economics 39: 85-99. 
Rotmans, J., Dowlatabadi, H., Fialr, J.A. and Parson, E.A. 1998. “Integrated assessment of climate 
change: evaluation of methods and strategies”, in Rayner, E. and Malone, E.L. (eds.) Human 
Choice and Climate Change. Chapter 10. Columbus: Battelle Press. 
Schelling, T.C. 1992. “Some economics of global warming”. American Economic Review 82: 1-14. 
Schelling, T.C. 1995. “Intergenerational discounting”. Energy Policy 23: 395-401. 
Schultz, P.A. and Kasting, J.F. 1997. “Optimal reductions in CO2 emissions”. Energy Policy 25: 491-
550. 
Selden, T.M. and Song, D. 1994. “Environmental quality and development: Is there a Kuznets curve 
for air pollution estimates?”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 27: 147-162. 
Sen, A.K. 1982. “The choice of discount rates for social benefit–cost analysis”, in Lind, R.C. (ed.) 
Discounting for Time and Risk in Energy Policy. Washington DC: Resources for the Future: 325-
352. 
Spash, C.L. 1994. “Double CO2 and beyond: benefits, costs and compensation”. Ecological 




Squire, L. and van der Tak, H.G. 1975. Economic Appraisal of Projects. London: John Hopkins 
University Press. 
Stern, D.I., Common, M.S. and Barbier, E.B. 1996. “Economic growth, trade and the environment: 
implications for the environmental Kuznets curve”. World Development 24: 1151-1160. 
Tóth, F.L. (ed.) 1999. Fair Weather? Equity Concerns in Climate Change. London: Earthscan 
Publications. 
Tol, R.S.J. 1995. “The damage cost of climate change toward more comprehensive calculations”. 
Environmental and Resource Economics 19: 67-90. 
Weyant, J., Davidson, O., Dowlatabadi, H., Edmonds, J., Grubb, M., Parson, E. A., Richels, R., 
Rotmans, J., Shukla, P.R., Tol, R.S.J., Cline, W. and Fankhauser, S. 1995. “Integrated assessments 
of climate change: An overview and comparison of approaches and results”, in IPCC Climate 
Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press: 448. 
Wigley, T.M.L., Richels, R. and Edmonds, J.A. 1996. “Economic and environmental choices in the 
stabilization of atmospheric CO2 emissions”. Nature 379: 240-243. 
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). 1987. Our Common Future. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Yohe, G.H. 1999. “The tolerable windows approach: lessons and limitations”. Climatic Change 41: 
283-295. 
Young, O.R. 2002. The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change: Fit, Interplay, and Scale. 
Cambridge and London: MIT Press. 
  
